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Before considering the impact of  the “Asian Miracle” on growth theory, 
I need to consider when the term Asian Miracle became common among 
economists and what ideas preceded it. I also need to review the concept 
of growth theory, tracing its origins and its evolution. This is not an easy 
task because of the complex way that theory, measurement, and the needs 
of economic policy have interacted in the work of growth economists since 
World War II.
Nevertheless, I believe there is widespread agreement that two papers by 
Robert M. Solow, both published in the second half  of the 1950s are nodal 
points in the huge literature on the theory and measurement of long- term 
economic growth.1 They became nodal points despite the fact that similar 
growth models by others had been published about the same time. Solow 
(2007) has recently singled out a paper by the Australian economist Trevor 
Swan (1956) that embodied all of the elements of his model, but that had 
little impact on subsequent research.
10.1   Aggregate Production Functions, Total Factor Productivity, 
and Exogenous Technological Change
In his 2007 paper, Solow mused on this discrepancy. Why, he asked, did 
his paper become so infl uential? The way to do it, he said, was:
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2. In Europe, Jan Tinbergen, in a 1942 paper published in German, used a Cobb- Douglas 
function with an exponential time trend, which he interpreted as a measure of  changes in 
eﬃciency for Germany, Great Britain, France, and the United States. But Tinbergen’s paper 
did not become known in the United States until much later.
(i) [K]eep it simple; (ii) get it right; and (iii) make it plausible. (By getting 
it right, I mean fi nding a clear, intuitive formulation, not merely avoiding 
algebraic errors.) I suspect that all three of these maxims were working 
for the 1956 paper. It was certainly simple; it didn’t get lost in the com-
plications and blind alleys that beset Trevor Swan’s attempt; and it was 
plausible in the sense that it fi tted the stylized facts, oﬀered opportunities 
to test and calibrate, and didn’t require you to believe in something unbe-
lievable. (Solow 2007, 4)
In his 1957 paper, Solow applied a Cobb- Douglas production function to 
the explanation of the growth of U.S. output, with the astounding result that 
increases in the inputs of labor and capital explained only about 13 percent 
of the increase in output between 1909 and 1949. Eighty- seven percent was 
unexplained. Solow attributed this unexplained portion to improvements in 
technology, which he treated as being outside of the model; hence the term 
exogenous technological change.
From an empirical standpoint, perhaps the most important consequence 
of the Solow papers was to shift the attention of economists from labor 
productivity to total factor productivity as the principal measure of changes 
in economic eﬃciency or technological change. However, Solow’s analysis 
did not emerge, like Athena, fully grown from the head of Zeus.
Economists had been struggling with the concept of  total factor pro-
ductivity for several decades. Some such measure was, as pointed out by 
Griliches in 1996, much discussed in the 1930s, especially in connection with 
the National Bureau of Economic Research programs on developing time 
series in national income.2 This concern led the Bureau to launch projects 
that produced long- term time series on the measurement of capital forma-
tion in various sectors and in the economy as a whole. An interim report 
on the progress of this work was published by Goldsmith (1952). Bureau 
economists were constructing indexes of output divided by total input in 
the late 1930s, the 1940s, and the 1950s, and they identifi ed such indexes as 
measures of the eﬃciency of the economy (see, for example, Copeland and 
Martin 1938, Stigler 1947, Fabricant 1954, Kendrick 1955).
Perhaps the most important Bureau paper on total factor productivity 
prior to Solow’s work was published by Moses Abramovitz in 1956 under the 
title, “Resource and Output Trends in the United States since 1870.” Mak-
ing use of Simon Kuznets’s data on real national income, he estimated that 
real net product per capita had increased at an annual rate of 1.9 percent, 
quadrupling over the seventy- fi ve years between 1869 to 1878 and 1944 to 
1953. He also computed an index of all resources, labor, and various forms 
of property, weighted by their shares in national income. To his surprise, 
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3. As used in this chapter, the term Southeast Asia applies to the fi rst group of eight nations 
in table 10.2.
this index of inputs explained only 14 percent of the increase in output over 
the seventy- fi ve years. The remaining 86 percent was due to an unexplained 
increase in productivity.
The results were not only surprising to Abramovitz, but also defi ed ade-
quate explanation. He called the unexplained rise in total factor productivity 
“the residual,” and also a “measure of our ignorance.” He attributed much 
of the residual to errors in the measurement of the inputs. With respect to 
labor, he singled out changes in the age structure of the labor force, which 
concentrated hours of work at the most productive ages. He also noted the 
neglect of increases in skills and of investments in health and education and 
in on- the- job training of labor. On the side of capital, he emphasized the fail-
ure to measure the increased stock of knowledge, improvements in the orga-
nization and technique of production, and greater investments in research 
and development. He also pointed to, but did not attempt to measure, the 
contributions of increasing returns to scale, which Edward Denison later put 
at 10 percent of the increase in total factor productivity (Dension 1962).
10.2   Convergence and Divergence
In 1945, the idea of high- performing Asian economies was not in the 
mind of American or European economists. In the United States, econo-
mists worried about the problems created by the demobilization of over 20 
million people (half from military ranks and half from war industries) and 
their integration into the civilian labor force. There were widespread fears 
that America might slide into a severe new depression. In Europe, the central 
issues turned around the Allied occupation of Germany and Italy and the 
restoration of the war- devastated economies. In Asia, the central issues were 
the demilitarization of Japan and the restoration of the nations that had been 
occupied by Japan. On the horizon were problems related to the dismantling 
of the colonial empires of Britain, France, and other European powers.
Several events between 1945 and 1950 set the stage for the political 
economy of the remainder of the twentieth century. One was the outbreak 
of the Cold War and the strategy of containing the expansionist ambitions 
of the Soviet Union. Another was the rapid recovery of Western Europe 
and the transformation of West Germany into an ally in the anticommunist 
coalition. A third was the communist victory in the Chinese civil war that 
followed the defeat of Japan. Still another important event was the parti-
tion of India into independent Hindu and Muslim nations. There was also 
the emergence of newly independent governments throughout South and 
Southeast Asia3 that were each struggling to fi nd its road to rapid economic 
growth.
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As table 10.1 shows, the countries of South and Southeast Asia were at 
diﬀerent economic levels in 1950, at the beginning of this quest. Japan, an 
occupied nation, had suﬀered severe reversals in fortune and had slipped to 
a level of per capita income characteristic of a low middle- income economy. 
Even the more prosperous Asian nations shown in table 10.1 had per capita 
incomes that were less than a quarter of that of the United States. In con-
trast, the war- ravaged economies of Europe were by 1950 already on their 
way to a quarter century of unprecedented economic growth that would raise 
standards of living, health, and life expectancy for ordinary people to levels 
that few would have predicted (Crafts and Toniolo 1996). Thus the stage was 
set for intense debates among economists and policymakers about the way 
to deal with global disparities. Among the points at issue were the virtues of 
centralized and decentralized planning and whether international trade was 
a handmaiden of domestic economic growth or an obstacle to it.
When Western economists began talking and writing about convergence 
in the 1950s and 1960s, the focus of their conversation was not convergence 
between the West and the East, but convergence between Western Europe 
and the United States. Immediately after World War II, the United States 
was by far the richest country in the world, not only by per capita income 
but also by total income. With just 7 percent of the world’s population, the 
United States accounted for a quarter of  global gross domestic product 
(GDP) (Nelson 1991).
This does not mean that Western economists lost sight of the rest of the 
world. During the 1950s and 1960s, they developed an increasing interest in 
Table 10.1 A comparison of the per capita income of 15 nations in 1950 
(International Dollars of 1990)
China 439∗
Hong Kong 2,218∗∗
Indonesia 840∗∗
Korea (South) 770∗∗
Malaysia 1,559∗∗
Singapore 2,219∗∗
Taiwan 936∗∗
Thailand 817∗∗
India 619∗
Japan 1,926∗∗
France 5,270∗∗∗
Germany 3,881∗∗
Italy 3,502∗∗
United Kingdom 6,907∗∗∗
 United States  9,561∗∗∗  
Source: Maddison (2001).
Note: Rank by World Bank standards of 1990: ∗low- income; ∗∗lower- middle income; ∗∗∗upper-
 middle income.
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the progress of the ex- colonies of Asia, particularly India and China. The 
political leadership of both countries was heavily infl uenced by the Soviet 
model of centralized planning. Both countries developed successive fi ve-
 year plans for the economic growth of their countries. These plans sought 
rapid economic growth by placing special emphasis on the rapid develop-
ment of heavy industry. Both taxed rural areas to subsidize cities and urban 
industries.
However, India sought to achieve its objectives under a political democ-
racy, in which some industries would have government backing but the bulk 
of economic production and distribution would be left to the private sector. 
It also embarked on a protectionist policy aimed at promoting infant indus-
tries. New fi nancial institutions were set up that placed the supply of capital 
largely under the control of the government, which directed investment into 
sectors given prominence by the plan. The fi rst fi ve- year plan, which ran 
from 1951 to 1956, was successful in meeting its goals, and private enterprise 
expanded. As indicated by table 10.2, the annual rate of growth in per capita 
income during the plan was in the neighborhood of 2 percent. However, 
annual net investment was in the neighborhood of just 6 or 7 percent (Pepe-
lases, Mears, and Adelman 1961; Malenbaum 1959, 1982).
By the early 1960s, the Indian economy began to stumble. Not all of the 
problems were due to errors by policymakers. Some problems arose from 
border clashes with Pakistan and China. Some of the food shortages were 
due to droughts. But the main pressure on the food supply was due to explo-
sive growth of population as mortality rates fell sharply. As a result of the 
successful public health measures undertaken during the 1950s and 1960s, 
such killer diseases as cholera, malaria, and smallpox were brought under 
control, helping life expectancy at birth to rise from thirty- two to fi fty- one 
years between 1950 and 1968 (Chandrasekhar 1968). Moreover, growth of 
per capita income also raised the demand for food, putting upward pressure 
on food prices that pinched both the urban and rural poor. Government 
eﬀorts at land reform may actually have increased rural inequality (Mellor 
et al. 1968; Blyn 1971). Attempts at government- controlled industrialization 
thwarted private investment and promoted uncompetitive enterprises (She-
noy 1968; Sklaeiwitz 1966; Healy 1972; Bhagwati and Chakravarty 1969). 
As a result, Indian growth slipped badly during the fi rst half  of the 1960s 
(see table 10.2).
Although India and China were the cases most frequently discussed by 
economists, attention was also paid to other nations in Southeast Asia. Dur-
ing the 1960s, there was considerable pessimism about Indonesia’s future. 
Although there was a spurt of  economic growth immediately after inde-
pendence, during which the nation recovered from the setbacks associated 
with the Japanese occupation, the economy stagnated between 1955 and 
1965, a period long enough to make economists wonder if  Indonesia could 
overcome its problems (Mears 1961). Beginning with the mid- 1960s, how-
316    Robert W. Fogel
ever, the country began vigorous growth that lasted for three decades (see 
table 10.2). Malaysia and Singapore also stagnated during the decade of 
the 1950s, contributing to the sense among some Western economists that 
adverse institutional factors might thwart their development. But in these 
countries, fortunes changed decisively in the 1960s.
Table 10.2 shows that eight Southeast Asian nations all grew vigorously 
from 1965 on, and that several of them (Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Thailand) 
had vigorous economic growth throughout the second half  of the twentieth 
century. Indeed, their growth rates far exceeded the previous growth rates of 
the industrialized countries. Few American or European economists antici-
pated growth rates that would double, triple, or quadruple the long- term 
rates of the industrial leaders between 1820 and 1950.
The most startling change of fortune was in Japan. With the outbreak 
of the Korean War, United Nations forces placed large orders with Japan, 
greatly stimulating its industrial growth. Even after the end of  fi ghting, 
Japan’s economy benefi ted from large orders for the buildup of the U.S. 
military establishment in the Pacifi c region. The Japanese export boom 
powered the dramatic rise in the Japanese economy. In one industry after 
another, including scientifi c instruments, cameras, sewing machines, and 
shipbuilding, Japanese fi rms displayed their command of the latest tech-
nology. During the 1960s, Japan moved from producing under a half  million 
cars to becoming the world’s second- largest supplier, displacing Germany 
and France, among others. The rise of auto production helped promote the 
expansion of steel and moved the country toward world preeminence in that 
basic product (Allen 1972). As table 10.2 shows, from 1950 through 1970, the 
growth of Japanese per capita income exceeded that of all the other high-
 performing economies. In the space of  two decades, Japanese per capita 
income increased more than fi vefold, a feat that had required more than a 
century for the nations that led the industrial revolution (Kuznets 1971a; 
Maddison 1995). Although the growth of Japanese per capita income slowed 
after 1970, it still increased by about 40 percent between 1970 and 1980, 
making it the second largest economy in the world, bigger than France and 
the United Kingdom combined (Maddison 1995).
During the late 1960s and early 1970s, many analysts became alarmed at 
what appeared to be the unchecked growth of population in Asia. It was 
widely predicted that such growth would not only swamp the capacity of 
South and Southeast Asia to feed itself, but would also smother the tenuous 
economic growth of the region. In the 1950s, many demographers had pre-
dicted that population growth would moderate because a decline in fertility 
would soon follow the decline in the death rate, which had caused the Asian 
population explosion. That view was called the theory of the demographic 
transition. But fertility rates remained high through the end of the 1960s, 
causing some demographers to declare that the theory of the demographic 
transition was dead (Coale 1975). As it turned out, that gloomy forecast was 
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incorrect. As table 10.3 shows, between 1970 and 1980, total fertility rates fell 
sharply in all Southeast Asian nations. Today all of these nations, except for 
Malaysia and Indonesia, have total fertility rates below replacement. Indeed, 
fertility rates in most of these nations are below the fertility rates of three of 
the fi ve rich nations shown in table 10.3.
The forecast that Southeast Asia would be unable to feed itself  because 
of the unbridled growth of population also turned out be erroneous. Table 
10.4 shows the food situation throughout South and Southeast Asia in 1961. 
Per capita consumption of calories in China, even after the famine, was at 
or below the level of consumption in England and France toward the end 
of the eighteenth century (Floud et al., forthcoming). The same desperate 
situation prevailed in India, Thailand, and Korea. By 2000, the food situa-
tion had changed dramatically. Despite the erroneous agricultural policies 
that precipitated the famine of 1960 and 1961, and again slowed agricul-
ture during the “Cultural Revolution” of 1966 to 1967, China’s progress in 
agriculture between 1962 and 2000 has been remarkable (Clark 1976; Lin 
1998). China not only found a way to feed itself, but did so well enough to 
increase its average daily consumption of calories by 73 percent, despite the 
near doubling of its population. Although not as dramatic, there were also 
Table 10.3 Secular trends in total fertility rates
  1950  1960  1970 1980 1990 2000 2005 2007
China 6.24 5.93 4.76 2.68 2.10 1.89 1.60 1.60
Hong Kong 4.43 4.97b 3.49 2.06 1.27 1.04 1.00 1.00
Indonesia 5.49 5.42 5.10 4.10 3.04 2.42 2.60 2.40
Korea (South) 5.18 5.60 5.24 4.02 1.77 1.47 1.20 1.10
Malaysia 6.83 6.72 5.15 3.91 3.77 2.96 3.30 2.90
Singapore 6.41 5.43c 3.10 1.74 1.87 1.44 1.30 1.30
Taiwand 5.79 4.00 2.51 2.27 1.76 1.20 1.10
Thailand 6.62 6.42 5.01 3.52 2.10 1.86 1.70 1.70
India 5.97 5.81 5.43 4.75 3.80 3.07 3.00 2.90
Japan 3.30a 2.01 2.07 1.74 1.54 1.36 1.30 1.30
France 2.86a 2.80d 2.48 1.95 1.78 1.88 1.90 2.00
Germany (West) 2.10 2.41 2.01 1.46 1.45 1.38 1.30 1.30
Italy 2.40 2.42d 2.38 1.64 1.26 1.24 1.30 1.40
United Kingdom 2.18 2.82 2.45 1.89 1.83 1.64 1.70 1.80
United States  3.08  3.65  2.47  1.84  2.08  2.06  2.00  2.10
Sources: Keyfi tz and Flieger (1990); Population Reference Bureau (see http://www.prb.org/datafi nd/
datafi nder.htm; World Bank, World Development Indicators Online (see http://www.worldbank.org/data/
wdi2004/index.htm); CIA World Factbook (see https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the- world- fact
book/).
a1951
b1961
c1962
d1981
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substantial gains in caloric consumption in the rest of South and Southeast 
Asia, ranging from 12 to 68 percent. Another point worth noting is the 
improvement in the quality of the diet, as indicated by the increase in the 
proportion of nutrients coming from animals. In China, the rise was from 
under 4 to over 19 percent of total caloric consumption. Only Indonesia and 
India still have levels of the consumption of animal products that hearken 
back to eighteenth- century conditions in England and France (Floud et al., 
forthcoming). Still another problem is the unequal distribution of food in 
many of the nations of South and Southeast Asia. In these countries, the 
proportion of low birth weights is still high, which implies the early onset 
of chronic disabilities at middle and late ages, a problem that will contribute 
to the high cost of medical care for the elderly in future years (Barker 1998; 
Doblhammer and Vaupel 2001; Fogel 2003, 2004b).
Let us now consider expectations of economic growth right after World 
War II, viewing them from the standpoint of the present. At the close of 
World War II, there were wide- ranging debates about the future of capitalist 
economies that pivoted on the Keynesian proposition that a macroeconomic 
equilibrium is possible at less than full employment and, in particular, the 
interpretation of that proposition by Alvin Hansen in his 1938 presidential 
address to the American Economic Association (Hansen 1939). Hansen 
argued that secular stagnation was likely because of: (1) the end of the fron-
tier, (2) the end of rapid population increase, and (3) the end of capital-
Table 10.4 Trends in caloric consumption
  
In calories per capita per day
 
Percentage increase
 
Percentage of calories 
from animals
1961  2000  2003 1961–2000  1961–2003 1961  2000  2003
China 1,725a 2,979 2,940 72.7 70.4 3.8 19.4 21.9
Hong Kong
Indonesia 1,727 2,913 2,891 68.7 67.4 2.9 4.1 4.8
Korea (South) 2,147 3,093 3,035 44.1 41.4 2.7 15.0 6.2
Malaysia 2,401 2,917 2,867 21.5 19.4 10.5 17.8 17.9
Singapore
Taiwana
Thailand 1,938 2,459 2,424 26.8 25.1 8.8 11.7 12.5
India 2,073 2,489 2,473 20.1 19.3 5.5 7.9 8.2
Japan 2,468 2,753 2,768 11.5 12.2 9.6 20.5 20.6
France 3,194 3,597 3,623 12.6 13.4 31.7 37.7 36.8
Germany (West) 2,889 3,505 3,484 21.3 20.6 32.7 30.0 30.7
Italy 2,914 3,663 3,675 25.7 26.1 15.5 25.5 25.7
United Kingdom 3,240 3,312 3,450 2.2 6.5 38.8 30.1 30.6
United States 2,883 3,814 3,754 32.3 30.2 35.1 27.4 27.8
World  2,255  2,805 2,809 24.4  24.6  15.0  16.5  17.0
Source: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAOSTAT) nutritional data, 2004 (http://apps.fao
.org/default.jsp), using the “Food Balance Sheets” data collection.
a1962
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 intensive technological change. The key issue, as the stagnationists defi ned it, 
was not whether the growth of the GDP would come to an end, but whether 
a high level of government spending was necessary to prevent a high level 
of permanent unemployment, even if  GDP did grow.
That such a debate would erupt in anticipation of peace is not surpris-
ing. The alarm about massive unemployment was widespread in 1943 and 
1944 because the country was demobilizing over 11 million soldiers from 
the armed forces and there were some 9 million or more workers in defense 
industries that were simultaneously being let go. So there were about 21 mil-
lion people thrown on a job market of about 60 million, including the armed 
forces and the defense establishment (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1955, table 
220). But as it turned out, the recession of 1945 only lasted eight months 
and was followed by a robust expansion that lasted thirty- seven months. 
Moreover, the recession of 1949 and 1950 lasted eleven months and was 
followed by another robust expansion that lasted forty- fi ve months (U.S. 
Bureau of the Census 2003, table 771). The peak came in 1953 after the 
economy had already absorbed 20 million potentially unemployed workers, 
and unemployment was below 3 percent by 1953. Total civilian employment 
was up by 15 percent over the wartime peak (Bratt 1953).
Although unemployment remained over 5 percent during some of the 
years of the long 106- month Kennedy- Johnson expansion, it dropped to 
3.5 percent in 1969. So even a quarter of  a century after the war, there 
were still economists who believed that the United States could not have an 
economy with both growth and low unemployment unless there was a very 
big government sector. By the late 1950s, the United States and other Orga-
nization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries 
were well into the post–World War II expansion, now called “the Golden 
Age,” with growth rates twice the long- term average of the world leaders 
during 1840 to 1940. Measured by per capita income, the long- term average 
growth rate of the leaders prior to 1940 was about 1.9 percent per annum 
and the growth rate during the Golden Age was, for Western Europe, about 
3.8 percent (Kuznets 1971a; Maddison 1995; Crafts and Toniolo 1996). Over 
the whole period from 1950 to 1999, expansion multiples for GDP averaged 
about fi vefold in Western Europe and the United States (see table 10.5). The 
wide- ranging debates over the causes for the accelerated growth rates of the 
Golden Age suggested some points of consensus. These included the reduc-
tion of barriers to international trade, successful macroeconomic policies, 
and opportunities for catch- up growth following the end of World War II, 
especially in France, Germany, and Italy. The destruction of much of the 
prewar capital stock, the reconstruction aid that rebuilt industry with a more 
advanced technology, the successes of macroeconomic policy, the elasticity 
of the labor supply, high levels of education, and the weakness of vested 
interests have all been advanced as explanatory factors (Abramovitz 1990; 
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4. When the value of increased longevity and improved health are added to GDP, growth 
rates increase signifi cantly (Fogel 1989b, 2000, 2004a; Murphy and Topel 2005).
Mills and Crafts 2000; Crafts and Toniolo 1996; Denison 1967; Maddison 
1987, 1991, 1995; Olson 1982).4
The eventual fading away of  the stagnation thesis, of  the notion that 
there was something in the operation of capitalistic economies that made 
them inherently unstable, brought to the fore several new concerns. These 
included the growing gap in income between developed and less developed 
nations, and a new emphasis on cultural and ideological barriers to eco-
nomic growth in poor countries. In contrast to some of the early theories 
associated with the Harrod- Domar model, which suggested that poor coun-
tries would grow rapidly if  there were large injections of capital from rich 
countries, by the 1960s the emphasis was that the export of capital would 
fail to promote growth unless the deep cultural barriers that made these 
countries unreceptive to the conditions needed for economic growth were 
somehow overcome. Some commentators, most notably Gunnar Myrdal, in 
his three- volume work on the Asian economies, said that India would have 
diﬃculty in sustaining high growth because it promoted asceticism and thus 
undermined the acquisitive culture that spurred Western Europe (Myrdal 
1968; Lau 1969).
There was also a shift from worries about oversaving, which I must say, 
Table 10.5 Expansion multiples of GDP for 15 economies 1950–1999 (ratio of GDP 
in 1999 to GDP in 1950, international dollars)
United States 5.07
France 5.22
Germany 5.50
Italy 6.20
Spain 8.39
United Kingdom 3.19
5 European Nations 4.98
China 25.59
Hong Kong 28.01
Indonesia 9.48
South Korea 38.93
Malaysia 15.61
Singapore 36.72
Taiwan 46.84
Thailand 23.68
8 Southeast Asian Nations 24.06
India 8.11
 Japan  16.09 
Sources: Maddison (2001); World Bank, World Development Indicators Online (see http://
www.worldbank.org/data/wdi2004/index.htm).
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never caught on at certain universities. It did not catch on at Chicago or at 
Columbia. Nor did it catch on at the National Bureau of Economic Research. 
Analysts such as Simon Kuznets, Arthur Burns, and others thought that sav-
ings were not a threat to economic growth, but were a necessary condition 
for economic growth because you needed the savings to build both infra-
structure in developing countries and also to get a thriving public sector 
growing (Kuznets 1961; Colm 1962; interview with P. A. Samuelson, con-
ducted by Robert W. Fogel and Enid Fogel, taped recording, 1992).
There was, about this time, a new emphasis on export- led growth. The 
practice of  poor countries selling their exports to rich countries got a 
bad name during the interwar period and was widely viewed as exploita-
tion of these countries by imperial powers. The later view, looking at the 
Canadian and American experiences, was quite the contrary (North 1966; 
Kravis 1970). Selling raw materials and other labor- intensive products to 
the rest of the world is a way to get capital and entrepreneurship from the 
developed countries to provide those same talents and qualities to the less-
 developed countries. One of the great discoveries of economic historians 
during the 1960s and confi rmed in the 1980s and 1990s was that the Hobson-
 Hilferding- Lenin thesis that English coupon- clippers got rich from invest-
ments in poor countries such as India, and then withdrew large sums of 
annual earnings, was wrong. After the computer revolution, it was possible 
to put the whole late nineteenth- century portfolio of British overseas invest-
ments into machine- readable form (Simon 1970; Davis and Huttenback 
1986; Stone 1999). Lo and behold, it turned out that there was a strong cor-
relation between a country’s per capita income and the share of the British 
overseas portfolio invested in it. The United States received the largest share, 
followed by Canada and Argentina (which at the turn of the twentieth cen-
tury had one of the highest per capita incomes in the world). Of course, that 
did not stop diehard critics of Western imperialism, who then denounced 
Britain for failing to have invested in underdeveloped nations (Davis and 
Huttenback 1986).
10.3   The Asian Miracle
As remarkable as what was widely forecast in the post–World War II 
debates were the things not foreseen in the 1940s, 1950s, or even the early 
1960s. One of these was the extraordinary economic growth in Southeast 
and East Asia, beginning fi rst with Japan, which in four decades went 
from a poor, defeated country to the second largest economy in the world, 
increasing per capita income tenfold. This was a feat that took leaders of 
the industrial revolution about 150 years to accomplish (Kuznets 1971a). 
The economic miracle of the high- performing Asian economies other than 
Japan was also unforeseen, and that state of mind persisted into the 1970s. 
It was not that economists did not know that per capita income was rising, 
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but there was a widespread opinion that it could not last, that somehow it 
was a fl uke. That view was based on the uneven economic performances of 
several of the Southeast Asian nations. Indonesia, for example, had some 
catch- up growth during the fi rst half  of the 1950s but faltered in the 1960s. 
Of the “Four Asian Dragons,” only Taiwan did better than Italy or Germany 
between 1950 and 1970 (see table 10.2). The idea that all of the Southeast 
Asian nations, including China, were in the midst of  an unprecedented 
expansion that might aﬀect the global economic balance did not emerge 
until the early 1990s.
So, except for Japan, there was little excitement about the growth rates 
elsewhere in East Asia until the late 1970s and early 1980s, when some ana-
lysts began taking note of  the Korean economic miracle (gross national 
product [GNP] per capita tripled in less than two decades) (Krishnan 1982) 
and comparable accelerations in the growth rates of Hong Kong, Singapore, 
and Taiwan. These four economies began to be called the “Four Asian Drag-
ons” or the “Four Asian Tigers” (Hicks 1989).
The phrase “Southeast/East Asian Economic Miracle” and the acronym 
HPAE (for high- performing Asian economies) were added to the economic 
lexicon by the World Bank when it published a book, The East Asian Mir-
acle: Economic Growth and Public Policy, in 1993. The term was almost 
immediately embraced by economists, some of whom felt it neatly summa-
rized a new phase of global economic development, and by a few, such as 
Paul Krugman, who wrote a paper titled “The Myth of the Asian Miracle” 
(1994), arguing that the marginal productivity of capital would soon decline 
because the miracle depended mainly on investment in capital and not on 
eﬃciency growth. In later work, Krugman modifi ed his predictions (1998, 
Krugman and Wells 2005), allowing for a longer period of growth, but still 
maintaining his earlier skepticism.
However, Chinese economic growth did not slow down for reasons delin-
eated by Abramovitz in his 1956 paper. The new investments embodied new 
technologies that greatly improved the eﬃciency of the productive process. 
Moreover, China invested heavily in raising the educational level of the popu-
lation, concentrating fi rst on primary education. As early as 1980, the gross 
enrollment ratio5 of primary schools reached 113 (see table 10.6). The exten-
sion of secondary school has also been impressive, with the enrollment ratio 
rising from 46 in 1980 to 76 in 2006. The sharpest rate of increase has been at 
the tertiary level (colleges and universities), where the enrollment ratio tripled 
between 1980 and 1997, and tripled again between 1997 and 2004, reaching 
19 in the latter year. This rapid increase in educational levels was promoted 
both by business and political leaders who recognized not only that they had 
to expand the supply of highly trained technicians, but that the demand for 
high- tech consumer products required well- educated consumers.
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Hence, the marginal productivity of physical capital has risen, not only 
because of the advanced technology embodied in new physical investment, 
but also because of the greater investment in raising the quality of labor. 
The quality of labor has risen, not only because of formal education, but 
also because of on- the- job training, increased experience, improved health, 
and increased longevity. Rather than declining, the rate of increase in Chi-
nese per capita income rose to 9.2 percent per year between 1990 and 2005, 
which is more than a third higher than the growth rate during the previous 
fi fteen years. Indeed, there is no convincing evidence that long- term Chinese 
economic growth is faltering (Fogel 2007).
10.4   Endogenous Economic Growth
To those who know the nonmathematical literature of  the pre- 1975 
growth theorists, the belief  that endogenous theories of economic growth 
are an invention of the late 1980s is surprising. While it is true that Solow and 
some other modelers treated technological change as exogenous in papers 
Table 10.6 Gross enrollment ratios
  
Primary school
  
Secondary school
  
Tertiary schoolc
 
Age for 
compulsory 
attendance1980  1997  2006 1980  1997  2006 1980  1997  2005
China 113 123 111 46 70 76 2 6 19b 7–15
Hong Kong 107 94 98a 64 73 85 10 22 32
Indonesia 107 113 114 20 56 64 4 11 17 7–15
Korea (South) 110 94 105 78 102 96 15 68 90 6–15
Malaysia 94 101 101a 48 64 69a 4 12
Singapore
Taiwana
Thailand 99 87 108 35 58 78 5 21 43 6–14
India 83 100 112 30 49 54a 5 7 12b 6–14
Japan 101 101 100 93 103 101 31 41 54b 6–15
France 111 105 110 85 111 114 25 51 56b 6–16
Germany 
(West) 104 103 104 101 27 47 6–18
Italy 103 101 103 72 95 100 27 47 63b 6–14
United 
Kingdom 104 116 105 83 129 98 19 52 60b 5–16
United States  99  102  98  91  97  94  56  81  82b  6–16
Sources: National Center for Education Statistics 2002 (1980, 1997); World Resources Institute Earth Trend (http://
earthtrends.wri.org/searchable_db/index.php?stepcountries&cID[]63&cID[]91&cID[]189&cID[]190&theme
4&variable_ID423&actionselect_years). Unesco.org (http://stats.uis.unesco.org/unesco/ReportFolders/Report
Folders.aspx).
a2005
b2004
cIt has been argued that the high U.S. fi gures for tertiary education are misleading because of the wide range of educa-
tional content in U.S. institutions at the junior college and four- year undergraduate schools. While it is true that Euro-
pean gymnasiums provide educations equivalent to the fi rst two years of many U.S. colleges, the elite American univer-
sities provide educations that surpass those of the gymnasiums. At the doctoral and postdoctoral level, elite American 
universities are superb—hence, the large number of foreign students who fl ock to U.S. programs.
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written in the 1950s and 1960s, verbal theorists such as Simon Kuznets, 
Moses Abramowitz, Theodore W. Schultz, and Douglass C. North paid a 
great deal of attention to endogenous technological change, emphasizing 
the synergies between improvements in the quality and quantity of labor 
and of physical capital.
Kuznets (1966, 1971a, 1971b), for example, stressed that economic growth 
both required and produced major changes in the structure of the economy 
(defi ned as the distribution of inputs or output among the major sectors 
of  the economy). Not only were increases in agricultural productivity a 
condition for the rapid growth of manufacturing, but new manufacturing 
technologies, which produced more eﬃcient agricultural equipment or new 
varieties of seeds and fertilizer, were major factors in the growth of agricul-
tural productivity and stimulated changes in agricultural technology.
According to Kuznets, many current economic opportunities and prob-
lems were determined by economic conditions and relationships that evolved 
slowly, often taking many decades to work out. At a time when Keynes 
declared that “in the long run we are all dead,” an aphorism reiterated by 
many economists not only during the 1930s but during the 1940s and 1950s, 
Kuznets continued to call attention to the role of long- term factors that had 
to be taken into account by policymakers, factors that led him to conclude 
that the opportunities for returning to high employment levels and rapid 
economic growth were greater than generally believed in the decades imme-
diately following World War II.
Current social problems in the late 1960s and 1970s, Kuznets emphasized, 
were often the result of  past growth—the consequence of  past desirable 
attainments, which at a later time produce socially undesirable consequences 
that require remedial policy action. Of his numerous illustrations of this 
principle, one is particularly cogent: the explosion of population growth 
in the less developed nations of Asia, Africa, Oceania, and Latin America 
in the quarter century following World War II. This population explosion 
threatened to thwart eﬀorts to raise per capita incomes from their dismally 
low levels because birth rates remained traditionally high, while public 
health policies and improved nutrition cut death rates in these regions by 
more than 50 percent in less than a generation. One obvious solution to the 
problem was to reduce fertility, yet there was a web of traditional patterns of 
behavior and belief  that tended to keep fertility high. Nevertheless, Kuznets 
believed that properly designed public policies could hasten the social and 
ideological changes required to reduce fertility and to lead these societies 
to prefer a greater investment in a fewer number of children (Becker 1960, 
1981; Becker and Lewis 1973). Such a program required not only govern-
ment and private campaigns to disseminate the technology of birth control 
but a restructuring of social and economic incentives that would provide 
rewards for families with fewer children.
Yet, as the experience of the United States and other developed nations has 
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6. Further down the line, the drop in fertility rates creates new problems as the population 
ages. See Fogel (2003, 2004b), Floud et al. (forthcoming).
shown, the success of the program to curtail fertility is bound, much further 
down the line, to create a new set of issues, similar to those that have become 
the center of the modern women’s movement: the restructuring of society in 
such a way as to promote equal opportunity for women in all occupational 
markets. The rapid economic growth of 1945 to 1970 also produced new con-
cerns about equity issues, particularly between whites, blacks, and Hispanics, 
and gave momentum to the movement for equal rights for women.6
Economic growth creates social problems because it is profoundly disrup-
tive to traditional values and religious beliefs, to long- standing social and 
family patterns of organization, and to numerous monopolies of privilege. 
Despite the fact that modern economic growth has brought with it tremen-
dous increases in longevity and good health, has brought to the lower classes 
standards of living as well as social and economic opportunities previously 
available only to a tiny minority, and has greatly reduced the inequality in the 
income distribution of developed nations, the social restructuring of society 
required by modern economic growth has been fi ercely resisted—sometimes 
because of an unwillingness to give up traditional values and ways of life, 
sometimes by entrenched classes determined to protect their ancient privi-
leges. Because of the complex responses to change and because the epoch 
of modern economic growth was still unfolding, many aspects of the social 
restructuring that were underway were still obscure and diﬃcult to predict 
(Kuznets 1966, 15). As late as 1972, Kuznets felt compelled to point out that 
despite the multitude of  tentative partial generalizations, cross- sectional 
studies, and econometric exercises, there was as yet no “tested generaliza-
tion, signifi cantly specifi c to permit the quantitative prediction of aggregate 
growth, or even of changes in the structural parameters in the course of 
growth” (Kuznets 1972, 58).
Kuznets was particularly concerned with longitudinal issues, such as the 
length of the period of observation that was needed to identify the under-
lying process at work in any specifi c aspect of  economic growth. How, 
he asked, can one determine whether such a process, once identifi ed, is 
suﬃciently stable to provide a reliable basis for prediction? These problems 
are illustrated by an issue on which Kuznets was the preeminent investigator 
of his age: the interrelationship between demographic processes and modern 
economic growth.
A particularly important aspect of the issue was the concentration of the 
decline of death rates at early ages, which contributed to the reduction in 
fertility rates. The reduced fertility rate released a large proportion of the 
female labor force to gainful occupations, accelerated the transition to mod-
ern families, mobile and responsive to economic incentives, and promoted 
new ideologies conducive to economic growth (1966, 56–62). In subsequent 
The Impact of the Asian Miracle on the Theory of Economic Growth    327
work, Kuznets noted the increase in the share of women in the U.S. labor 
force from 17 percent in 1890 to nearly half  in the 1980s, which he attrib-
uted to the lower fertility rates, the shift in employment opportunities from 
manual to service sector positions, and urbanization, which made organized 
labor markets more accessible to women (Kuznets 1989; Fogel 1989a). He 
also called attention to the fact that the most rapidly growing occupations—
those in the professional, technical, clerical, sales, and other services—were 
the ones in which women had made the greatest inroads. Nevertheless, in 
the late 1950s and early 1960s, when the new women’s movement was still 
incipient, Kuznets did not anticipate fully the explosive entry of women into 
the labor force during the next quarter century, nor the new ideology that 
would facilitate that development (1966, 193–95).
Ideas of endogenous technological change were also deeply embedded 
in the work of economists who studied the diﬀusion of new technologies. 
Among the earliest of these studies was the dissertation of Zvi Griliches 
(1956) and papers based on it (particularly in 1957 and 1960), which ana-
lyzed the factors aﬀecting the rate of  diﬀusion of hybrid corn. Griliches 
traced that process from the early scientifi c research of agricultural experi-
mental stations to the sequential adoption of various strains of these seeds 
by commercial producers. He also analyzed the rate of spread of this type 
of seed by farmers, looking at the diﬀerence in the characteristics of early 
and late adopters within and across states. Indeed, it took more than half  a 
century for hybrid corn to displace its rivals everywhere.
Consequently, at any point in time, the existing average technology was 
a weighted average of  technologies of  diﬀerent vintages, not merely of 
the prehybrid seeds per se. Seed manufacturers produced new vintages of 
hybrid seeds as technology adapted to the climate and soil types of  par-
ticular regions and subregions. Griliches also related the educational level, 
institutional connections, and income of individual farmers to the rate at 
which they changed over to the new strains of corn.
What Griliches did for the diﬀusion of new technologies in agriculture, 
Edwin Mansfi eld did for diﬀusion of  industrial technologies. Mansfi eld 
(1971) measured the lag between invention and innovation for forty- six 
inventions. The lag varied from one year for Freon refrigerants to seventy-
 nine years for fl orescent lamps. The lag for some other notable inventions 
was twenty- four years for the distillation of hydrocarbons with heat and 
pressure, twenty- two years for television, twenty- seven years for zippers, 
thirteen years for radar, and fourteen years for jet engines.
He then turned to the factors that infl uence the decision to innovate. After 
emphasizing the risks associated with innovation (only two out of ten new 
products that emerge from research and development become commercial 
successes), he set forth the costs and benefi ts of both leading and waiting for 
others to lead. The investment needed to bring a new innovation to market 
is usually in the range of ten to twenty times the original research costs.
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7. See Perkins 2006a and Maddison 1998 for discussions of the lag of China and India in 
adapting modern technology.
Mansfi eld then analyzed the rates of  diﬀusion of  twelve innovations 
in four industries (coal, iron and steel, brewing, and railroads). He found 
that the diﬀusion of a new technique was generally a slow process. Among 
the factors that aﬀected the rate of diﬀusion were the size of the fi rm, the 
expected rate of profi t from investing in the innovation, the growth rate of 
the fi rm, the overall profi t level of the fi rm, and the liquidity of the fi rm.7
It was not only characteristics of the fi rms but also characteristics of the 
managers that infl uenced rates of diﬀusion of new technologies. Presidents 
of  early adopters of  complex new technologies were younger and better 
educated than heads of fi rms that were late adopters.
In subsequent studies, Mansfi eld (1980) found that both fi rm and indus-
try expenditures on research and development had a substantial impact on 
fi rm and industry rates of growth in productivity. Both basic and applied 
research, individually and in conjunction, increased productivity growth. 
With respect to interfi rm, interindustry, and international transfers of tech-
nology, Mansfi eld (1975) delineated among material, design, and capacity 
transfers. Capacity transfers often involved the transfers of people, since 
there was often “no substitute for person to person training and assistance” 
(373). That was especially the case when the transferred technology had to be 
adapted to take account of local conditions, including diﬀerences in relative 
costs, abilities, cultures, and climates (Mansfi eld 1972).
The notion of endogenous technological change did not begin with the 
cohort of Griliches and Mansfi eld. Walt W. Rostow (1990, especially chap-
ters 15 through 17 and 20) has summarized the known theories of techno-
logical change, endogenous and exogenous, going back several centuries. 
More relevant to the issues in this chapter is the work of Joseph Schumpeter, 
who was the most important growth theorist between the deaths of Smith 
and Malthus and his own death in 1950. His earlier work focused on long 
cycles in economic output, which he attributed to fl uctuations in the rate 
of inventions and innovations (Schumpeter 1934). His analysis led him to 
single out entrepreneurs as the dynamic agents of change, to point to the 
equity eﬀects of  economic growth (embodied in his concept of  “creative 
destruction”), and to make the creative clusters of innovations inherently 
infl ationary. Later in his career, Schumpeter focused on the confl ict between 
economic concentration and competitive markets, and between the capitalist 
system of economic organization and the political, social, and intellectual 
movements that were hostile to capitalism for ideological reasons. It was 
these confl icts, he argued, rather than the secular diminution of investment 
opportunities, which threatened the continuation of economic growth under 
a system of political democracy (Rostow 1990, especially 233–42).
Theodore W. Schultz was another major motivator of the theory of endog-
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enous technological change. He received the most acclaim for his contribu-
tions to the theory of human capital (Schultz 1962, 1971). But that was only 
one aspect of his broader concern with economic growth and the elimination 
of poverty. These broader concerns led him to examine closely the impact of 
government fi scal policies and specifi c interventions into agriculture in both 
developed and developing countries, policies that distorted agricultural pro-
duction and had perverse eﬀects on the distribution of income. Like Schum-
peter, Schultz was concerned about new sources of future income growth, 
and this concern led him to recognize that in the twentieth century, human 
capital had become more important than physical capital in explaining both 
economic growth and the inequality of the income distribution. His theory 
of human capital led him to conclude that unregulated high fertility was a 
major factor in destabilizing an agricultural sector. Such considerations also 
caused him to emphasize the importance of the investment in improving 
nutrition and health as a key to economic growth in poor nations and to 
identify investment in “allocative skills” as a key to dealing with problems 
of disequilibria (Bowman 1980).
Schultz was infl uenced in his thinking about human capital by his experi-
ences with postwar reconstruction. Despite the devastation of Europe, all 
of  the war- ravaged countries experienced rapid economic growth in the 
1950s, quickly exceeding their prewar levels. This led Schultz to dwell on 
the central role of human capital in modern economic growth, to consider 
the possibility that a signifi cant share of  the so- called residual factor in 
economic growth was due to improvements in the quality of the inputs, par-
ticularly in the quantity of capital embodied in human labor. Although his 
empirical work on this question focused on education, Schultz recognized 
that improvements in health, in the capacity to process information, in the 
development of allocative skills, and in on- the- job training might be more 
important than the eﬀects of formal education per se.
Abramovitz was another of the nonmathematical theorists who grappled 
with issues of endogenous technological change throughout his career. In 
papers published in 1972 and 1993, he called attention to the shifting bias 
of  technological change, which was intensive in physical capital between 
1850 and 1950 (the era of the building of railroads and the electrical grid) 
but became human capital- intensive thereafter (Abramovitz 1972). Since 
1950, “technological change tended to raise the marginal productivity of 
capital in the form of education and training of the labor force at all levels; 
in the form of practical knowledge acquired by deliberate investment of 
resources in research and development; and in other forms of intangible 
capital, such as the creation and support of corporate structures and cultures 
and the development of product markets, which are the infrastructure of 
economies of scale and scope” (Abramovitz 1993, 229).
Abramovitz also stressed the interdependence of technological progress 
and both tangible and human capital accumulation. He noted both tangible 
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8. Helpman (2004) provides an insightful tour of the new growth theory, pointing out its 
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and intangible capital formation infl uenced the pattern of technological pro-
gress. But he cautioned Lucas, Romer, and other contributors to the “new 
growth theory” from overemphasizing the impact of capital accumulation 
on the direction of technological change. Although the bias of technological 
change was infl uenced by capital accumulation, it was also infl uenced by the 
evolution of scientifi c and technological knowledge that was “quite unre-
lated to the terms of factor supply,” including the infl uence of relative factor 
costs, the evolution of science and technology, and the “impact of political 
and economic institutions and modes of organization on which the discov-
ery and acquisition of new knowledge depend” (Abramovitz 1993, 237).
10.5   Bridges between Two Cohorts of Theorists on Technological Change
This section compares the work of Zvi Griliches, Richard Nelson, and 
Dale W. Jorgenson, whose research on technological change spanned the 
period from the mid- 1950s to the present. All of these investigators focused 
on the diﬃculties of measuring technological change. All three were con-
cerned with endogenous as well as exogenous sources of  technological 
change. All three were deeply involved in problems of  the identifi cation 
and measurement of endogenous technological change. Although they dealt 
with national patterns of change, much of their research was focused at the 
level of industries and on the characteristics of the fi rms that comprised the 
industries. All three welcomed the new enthusiasm brought to the studies of 
technological change and economic growth by a younger cohort of investi-
gators led by Romer, Lucas, Helpman, Barro, Acemoglu, Aghion, Howitt, 
Krugman, and Young, among others.8
Griliches’s studies were notable for their display of statistical skills. He 
made important contributions to econometric modeling of  specifi cation 
biases, to models of distributed lags, and to models that dealt with “unob-
served” or “omitted” variables, such as ability. He also developed the hedonic 
technique for separating changes in the prices of  complex products into 
components due to improvement in qualities of such products (such as auto-
mobiles and pharmaceuticals) and to infl ation. He was also one of the pio-
neers in the study of the impact of investments in research and development 
on productivity at the fi rm, industry, and aggregate levels. He emphasized 
that much of the unmeasured residual in productivity gains was due to the 
“spillover” eﬀects in one fi rm or industry on the inputs and outputs of other 
fi rms and industries (Heckman 2006; Trajtenberg and Berndt 2001; David 
2003). These are all key points in the explanation of the Asian Miracle (see 
section 10.7).
Richard Nelson has been a thoughtful analyst of the economics of inven-
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tion and the processes by which inventions become incorporated in the pro-
cess of production and marketing. In the late 1950s, he critically surveyed 
the economic literature on these topics and pointed to numerous unresolved 
issues. Among the points he stressed were the high risks in research and 
development, and the few initiatives launched by fi rms that ever got to the 
point of yielding commercially viable projects (1959). He also delved into 
the problem of explaining changes in total factor productivity and attrib-
uted much of the diﬀerence between Solow and Denison to such issues as 
the rate of improvement in the quality of labor and capital and the average 
age of the capital stock. But he also emphasized that interactions between 
these variables had not been suﬃciently explored, and he also stressed the 
need to focus on the processes, which diﬀered among fi rms, that aﬀected 
incentives and their feedback (1964). In later papers (1981, 1988; Nelson 
and Wright 1992), Nelson stressed the need to focus on the processes that 
generate, screen, and spread new technology at the fi rm, interfi rm, and inter-
industry levels. Along with Stanley Fischer (1993) and others, Nelson placed 
much emphasis on the role of macroeconomic policy in creating favorable 
contexts for rapid technological progress. Nelson collaborated with Harold 
Pack (1999) on an insightful discussion of the interrelationship of the Asian 
Miracle and Modern Growth Theory with a paper of  the same title (see 
section 10.7).
Jorgenson has been at the forefront of the elaboration of the theory of 
production and in the measurement of  the improvements in the quality 
of  inputs, the improvements in the economic and social organization of 
production, and the identifi cation of  spillover eﬀects that account for a 
signifi cant part of unmeasured inputs. Jorgenson’s early work made impor-
tant contributions to the theory of economic growth in dual economies: 
two- sector models with an advanced and a backward sector (1961a, 1961b). 
Indeed, much of his work has focused on the movement from a highly aggre-
gated level of analysis to disaggregated levels.
Thus, he has placed a great deal of emphasis on moving to the industry 
and fi rm levels for purposes of  both analysis and measurement, demon-
strating that in so doing, one could explain much of Solow and Denison’s 
unmeasured residual. In this connection, he pointed to the need to recog-
nize that much of the change in total factor productivity was explained by 
measuring the substitution of higher qualities of labor for lower ones as 
well as the substitution of improved vintages of capital for earlier ones. He 
also sought to measure unmeasured spillover eﬀects from one industry or 
one fi rm to another (1967, with Griliches; 1969, with Christenson; 1980 and 
1986, with Fraumeni; and 1980, with Gollup). Jorgenson also called atten-
tion to the need to take account of changes in the quality of intermediate 
goods at the sectoral level, estimating that these changes explained more of 
the change in sectoral output than improvements in the quality of labor and 
capital (1990, with Kuroda).
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Jorgenson has led the way in explaining the sharp increase in U.S. pro-
ductivity growth that began in the 1990s. In his presidential address to the 
American Economic Association (2001) and in papers with Stiroh (1999, 
2000), he attributed the rapid diﬀusion of  information technology (IT) 
between 1990 and 2000 to the decline in IT prices, which he said was trig-
gered by an earlier and even sharper decline in the prices of semiconductors. 
Moreover, all of the increase in U.S. total factor productivity during 1990 
and 1995 and two- thirds of the increase during 1995 and 2000 was due to 
improvements in IT.
In several of his recent papers (e.g., 2001, 2005; Jorgenson and Nomura), 
he found that in the United States, IT- using industries were leading eco-
nomic growth, and through wage eﬀects, were promoting improvements in 
labor quality, and that IT was having a similar eﬀect on other G7 countries 
(Crafts 2004). Improvements in the quality of inputs, best measured at the 
industry level, were major factors in output growth (e.g., 1992, with Gollop; 
1999 and 2000, with Stiroh; 2005, with Nomura; 2005).
In a paper with Dougherty (1996), Jorgenson characterized the recent 
work on endogenous economic growth as an eﬀort to account for spillover 
eﬀects. He linked unexplained productivity to spillover eﬀects that increase 
output in unrelated fi rms and industries but were normally unmeasured. 
Jorgenson provided a direct accounting of the benefi ts of such spillovers. In 
his most recent paper with Vu, Jorgenson fi nds that the accelerated pace of 
globalization and IT penetration between 1989 and 2006 may be important 
factors in explaining the jump in output productivity. He estimates that 
developing Asia accounted for 40 percent of global economic growth during 
this period (Jorgenson and Vu 2009).
10.6   The Economic Historians
No students of economic growth have been more absorbed in issues of 
endogenous technological change than economic historians. Their interest 
in these issues is as old as the concept of the Industrial Revolution of the 
second half  of  the eighteenth and the fi rst half  of  the nineteenth centu-
ries. They traced out the succession of inventions in textiles and iron that 
transformed these industries, as well as successive improvements in steam 
engines going back to the early seventeenth century, that made it possible to 
substitute mechanical power for human power in mining and manufacturing 
and animal power in transportation.
This progress turned partly on accidents, but mainly on the creation of an 
economic, social, and political environment that encouraged and supported 
new technologies, by ethical and religious dictums and by progrowth ideolo-
gies. As David Landes put it, Britain’s large lead in technology over France 
(citing Joel Mokyr [1985] and Walt Rostow [1979]), was no accident. With 
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one innovation after another, repeatedly England was the leader, and France 
and others were followers.
British inventors, Landes said, were responding to the high cost of labor 
(in the case of textile inventions) and the vicissitudes of deep coal mines (in 
the case of steam engines). Moreover, the British pool of skills in such areas 
as millwork and machine building was apparently larger than in Continental 
countries. It was not that Britain had a large monopoly of skills, but “the 
size of the pool, its free, noncorporate character, and direction (provenance) 
of its eﬀorts and experience. These seem to have made a diﬀerence” (Landes 
1994, 650; Crafts 1997, 1995; see also Harley 1992 and Temin 1997).
Landes (1994) continued:
The key invention falls within the Smithian paradigm: the adoption of 
rural putting- out. This goes back to the middle ages and represents a 
crucial departure from the town- based, corporate (guild) mode of pro-
duction. The key is the division of labour and the recruitment into the 
production process of women and children. Say no more: the eﬀect is to 
reduce costs and prices, increase demand, widen the market, promote 
further division of  labour, lay the basis in specialization for small but 
cumulative improvements in technique . . . The eﬀect of this fall in prices 
and increase in markets at home and abroad was to turn Britain into the 
workshop of the world. (651)
Among economic historians writing about changes in patterns of U.S. 
economic growth, no one has done more to emphasize the critical role of 
institutions in aﬀecting economic growth than Douglass C. North. In an 
article published in 1968, North estimated the substantial increases in the 
total factor productivity, on the order of  300 percent, in ocean shipping 
between 1600 and 1850. The principal technological change was the increase 
in payload capacity brought about by the changes in the design of the ships, 
which became larger and swifter. The more eﬃcient ships (called fl utes) had 
been in use in the Baltic trade since the early seventeenth century. Why did 
it take so long for ships of this design to become dominant in the Atlantic 
trade? The answer, said North, was the threat of piracy located in the Carib-
bean. As long as the pirate threat existed, freighters had to be armed, and 
arming required smaller, sturdier ships that could withstand the recoil of 
the canons. It was not until the elimination of pirates from their shelters 
in the Caribbean that the faster, longer, lower- cost ships became dominant 
in the transatlantic trade.
Two years later, together with Robert Paul Thomas, North published an 
“Economic Theory of the Growth of the Western World” (1970). In that 
essay, they argued that changes in product and factor prices, promoted by 
population growth and the increased size of markets, led to a set of institu-
tional changes that channeled incentives toward “productivity- raising types 
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of economic activity. . . . These institutional innovations and accompany-
ing changes in property rights built productivity into the system, enabling 
Western man to fi nally escape the Malthusian cycle” (1). North and Thomas 
collaborated again on articles explaining the rise and fall of the manorial 
system (1971) and on the substitution of settled agriculture for hunting and 
gathering (1977).
In a highly infl uential paper with Barry R. Weingast, a political scientist, 
North (1989) investigated the impact of the English Glorious Revolution 
of 1688, which “fundamentally redesigned” fi scal and governmental institu-
tions to limit the confi scatory power of the crown. The elevation of the role 
of Parliament and introduction of an independent judiciary “produced a 
marked increase in the security of private rights” (804). As a result, private 
capital markets fl ourished and the government was able, within a decade, to 
increase borrowing by an order of magnitude. The institution also created 
more favorable conditions for economic growth, including the growth and 
development of banks, the creation of new instruments of private credit, 
and the promotion of a wide array of businesses (North 2005).
Several other economic historians have had a substantial infl uence on the 
recent wave of growth theory. Papers by Stanley Engerman and Kenneth 
Sokoloﬀ called attention to the importance of distant history in establish-
ing institutions and pathways that infl uence patterns of current economic 
growth (Engerman and Sokoloﬀ 1997; Sokoloﬀ and Engerman 2000). This 
theme has resonated with growth theorists such as Acemoglu, Johnson, and 
Robinson (2000, 2001) and Ray (2008). Paul David’s emphasis on the impact 
of path dependency, which links particular inventions and the large invest-
ments by their users to explain the diﬃculty of getting users to switch to 
more eﬃcient substitutes for the original innovation, has also been infl uen-
tial (David 1985).
In another important paper, David (1990) explained the long lag between 
the invention of new technologies and their impact on economic growth 
using the electrical dynamo as a case in point. Even when engineers cor-
rectly foresaw the potential usefulness of electricity, a wide range of busi-
nesses were still based on mechanical power, and numerous details had to be 
addressed to make the new type of power advantageous for many diﬀerent 
products and in various locales. Moreover, architects, engineers, and man-
agers had to be trained to design, install, and operate the new systems. The 
risks perceived by capitalists were large enough to cause many to hesitate to 
invest. These problems were worked on slowly. It took about four decades 
to go from the construction of the fi rst generating stations to the 50 percent 
point in the diﬀusion of electricity to users.
Economic historians have also made major contributions to the study of 
industrial organization and its synergy with economic growth. Carefully 
tracing the growth of big business in the United States, Alfred Chandler Jr., 
the doyen of managerial history, laid out the circumstances that led to the 
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rise of large- scale enterprises led by professional managerial hierarchies. He 
also compared the U.S. corporate structure with large enterprises in England 
and Germany (Chandler 1977, 1990). Chandler had a strong infl uence on 
the theory of industrial organization as it was developing during the last 
third of the twentieth century (Teece 1993; Caves 1990). Eﬀorts to reassess 
Chandler’s legacy began to appear in the late 1990s and have continued, 
aimed at taking account of new industrial structures brought on by changes 
in technology, markets, business strategy, and communications (Galambos 
1997; Ghemawat 2002).
It remained for Lamoreaux, Raﬀ, and Temin (2003) to provide a new 
synthesis of the evolution of industrial organization as it stood at the begin-
ning of the new millennium. Their aim was not only to take account of the 
changed circumstances that led the classical Chandlerian fi rm—vertically 
integrated and diversifi ed—to be outperformed by more specialized and 
vertically disintegrated fi rms, but to also provide a theory of the new tenden-
cies in fi rms and markets. They developed a dual perspective that brought to 
the fore the economic logic behind business choices. Changes in industrial 
structures and markets refl ected the vast increases in per capita income, the 
huge declines in the cost of processing information, and the large decrease 
in transportation costs that altered spatial maps and permitted products to 
be designed again for individual needs.
10.7   The Impact of the Asian Miracle on Growth Theory
The Asian Miracle began to have a profound impact on growth theory 
well before the full scope of that miracle was apparent. The early papers in 
the new wave of theoretical work, those that appeared between 1986 and 
1990, were responding mainly to European and U.S. developments in the 
period between 1950 and 1980. When theorists shifted some of their focus 
to Asia during the fi rst half  of the 1990s, they concentrated mainly on the 
Four Little Dragons, sometimes adding such new contenders for the title of 
“miracle” as Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand. China and India did not 
move to center stage until the second half  of the 1990s.
The extraordinarily high growth rates of China since 1980 and of India 
since the middle of  the 1990s have profoundly challenged the discussion 
of theorists and policymakers. These extraordinary growth rates, if  they 
persist for two or three decades, will radically alter the global economic play-
ing fi eld, transforming China and India from merely “newly industrializing 
countries” to titans of the global economy.
Tables 10.7 and 10.8 compare the global economy in 2000 with a possible, 
perhaps probable, restructuring less than a generation from now. In the year 
2000, the global economy was dominated by six groupings of  countries: 
the United States; the European Union (which then consisted of  fi fteen 
countries [EU15]); India; China; Japan; and a group of six Southeast Asian 
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countries (Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, South Korea, and 
Taiwan [SE6]). As measured by GDP, these six groupings accounted for 
73 percent of the world’s economic output and 57 percent of the global popu-
lation (see table 10.7). The balance of the world (including Latin America, 
Africa, and Eastern Europe) accounted for about 28 percent of GDP and 
42 percent of the global population.
Table 10.8 presents a not improbable set of forecasts for 2040. The popu-
lation forecasts are those of the United Nations. The economic forecasts are 
mine but were infl uenced by the forecasts of the CIA and The Economist. 
To my mind, the most unsettling of the forecasts in table 10.8 is the relative 
decline of the European Union implied by its stagnation in population and 
its modest growth in GDP.
Although the EU population in 2000 exceeded that of the United States 
by about a third, by 2040 the EU population will be somewhat smaller than 
that of the United States. The projected stagnation of the EU15 population 
is based primarily on the persistence of extremely low fertility rates. The total 
fertility rate (roughly the average number of children a woman is expected 
to have during the course of her childbearing years) has fallen far below the 
level required for the reproduction of the population (2.1 children) in most 
EU15 countries, and has been below reproduction for several decades.
One implication of the low fertility rate is that the population of the EU15 
is aging rapidly. In the year 2000, the median age in Italy and Germany, for 
example, was about forty, which is a decade higher than in China and half  a 
decade higher than in the United States. By 2040, the median age in Italy and 
Germany is predicted to be about fi fty. This rapid aging of many EU15 coun-
tries means that their dependency ratios (the ratio of economically inactive to 
economically active persons) will soar. These demographic factors will, by 
themselves, signifi cantly curtail the capacity for economic growth. However, 
Table 10.7 The global distribution of GDP in 2000, by grouping of nations
Grouping  
Population 
(in millions)  
Percent 
of total  
GDP in billions 
of $ (PPP)  
Percent 
of total
United States 282 5 9,601 22
European Union (EU15) 378 6 9,264 21
India 1,003 16 2,375 5
China 1,369 22 4,951 11
Japan 127 2 3,456 8
6 South East Asian 
Countries (SE6) 381 6 2,552 6
Subtotals 3,540 57 32,199 73
Rest of the world 2,546 42 12,307 28
World  6,086  99  44,506  101
Source: Fogel (2007).
Note: PPP  purchasing power parity.
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9. The expansion of the EU15 to EU27 will help to invigorate the EU15 through increased 
cross- country migration. However, it is unlikely that the migration rate will be large enough to 
oﬀset the low fertility rates in Italy, France, and other EU15 countries. Moreover, resistance to 
immigration is likely to increase in low- fertility countries as fears of loss of national identity 
increase.
political and cultural factors appear to be reinforcing the impediments to 
economic growth. These include limitations on the length of the work week 
and increasingly heavy taxes on businesses to support large social welfare 
programs (that are nevertheless facing bankruptcy) and are threatening to 
make EU15 fi rms uncompetitive in the global market.9
I do not mean to imply that labor productivity and per capita income in 
the EU15 will not grow. They will grow at a rate that, by past standards, was 
not bad (about 1.8 percent per annum), but they will not be able to match 
the surge in growth that will prevail in South and East Asia. The European 
market will be about 60 percent larger in 2040 than it was in 2000. But the 
U.S. market will be over 300 percent larger, India’s will be over 1,400 percent 
larger, and China’s will be 2,400 percent larger. Indeed, the Chinese market 
in 2040 by itself  will probably be larger than the combined markets of the 
United States, the EU15, India, and Japan. It may well be the case that En-
glish will survive as the principal commercial language beyond 2040, but I 
suspect that there will be an explosion of business managers in the West who 
also speak Mandarin.
The possibility of such a massive restructuring of the global economy 
has substantially changed the conversation of growth theorists of the late 
1980s. The debates of those years were aimed at altering the canon of growth 
models to allow for slighted variables (such as knowledge and experience), 
changed parameters (such as large capital shares and diﬀerent elasticities), 
to rethink the implications of returns to scale and externalities in diﬀerent 
contexts suggested by new analyses of available empirical information, and 
Table 10.8 The global distribution of GDP in 2040, by grouping of nations
Grouping  
Population 
(in millions)  
Percent 
of total  
GDP in billions 
of $ (PPP)  
Percent 
of total
United States 392 5 41,944 14
European Union (EU15) 376 4 15,040 5
India 1,522 17 36,528 12
China 1,455 17 123,675 40
Japan 108 1 5,292 2
6 South East Asian 
Countries (SE6) 516 6 35,604 12
Subtotals 4,369 50 258,083 85
Rest of the world 4,332 50 49,774 16
World  8,701  100  307,857  101
Source: Fogel (2007) and United Nations (2009).
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10. See Barro and Sala- i- Martin (2004) for an excellent review of growth theory and its 
empirical fi ndings. For the foundational basis of the new work, see Romer (1986); Lucas (1988); 
and Barro (1991); Barro and Sali- i- Martin (1997). See also Jones (1997). For a critique of the 
empirical underpinning of this work, see Srinivasan and Bhagwati (2001).
to introduce such new terminology as “absolute” and “conditional” con-
vergences.10 The old set of issues has not been abandoned, but the locus has 
shifted, and a number of new issues have emerged.
One of  the central issues among growth theorists is whether increases 
in factor inputs or in total factor productivity has been the main source 
of economic growth in the surging Asian economies (Perkins and Rawski 
2008). A companion issue is the role of governments and of macroeconomic 
policy in encouraging, permitting, and sustaining economic growth (Young 
1995; Krugman 1994; 1998; Stiglitz 1996, 2001; Kim and Lau 1994; Park 
2002). Growth theorists are also grappling with the implications of uneven 
economic growth across the provinces and socioeconomic groupings of both 
China and India, for the long- run economic and political stability of both 
countries (Chaudhuri and Ravallion 2006; Zakaria 2005, 2006; Pei 2006; 
2007, Lopez 2004).
Jere Berhman, an old hand in the study of  economic growth among 
developing nations, surveyed the literature (2001) on growth in Asia and 
elsewhere, pointing out changing viewpoints since the end of World War II. 
In the 1950s, he wrote, the key issues raised by growth economists were 
(1) the need to raise capital- to- labor ratios; (2) the problem of overcoming 
the ineﬃciency of markets; (3) the key role of industrialization in overcom-
ing low growth rates; (4) the belief  that international trade was harmful to 
developing countries because the benefi ts of  trade were siphoned oﬀ by 
monopolistic producers in rich countries; and (5) the belief  that govern-
ments were unbiased, had good information, and pursued policies appro-
priate to promoting growth. By the beginning of the twenty- fi rst century, 
most of  these ideas had been jettisoned. Among the ideas that replaced 
them were the proposition that merely throwing capital at the problems was 
not enough, that markets are better than bureaucrats (many of whom were 
rent- seekers) in allotting resources, and that international trade stimulated 
rather than retarded growth.
Dwight H. Perkins, who has been studying economic, social, and political 
developments in China and other Southeast Asian nations for more than 
half  a century, recently put the accelerated growth in Chinese per capita 
income since 1978 in perspective (2006a). The available evidence suggests 
that China’s decline from relative prosperity in the thirteenth century to 
relative poverty at the end of World War II was due partly to its lag in apply-
ing science to the development of modern technology, partly to destructive 
invasions, and partly to civil wars that prevented the emergence of a strong 
central government needed to provide the institutional foundation for mod-
ern economic growth. While some of these problems were solved after the 
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accession of  Mao Zedong, mistakes in economic policy, combined with 
Mao’s desire to launch a cultural revolution that would transform Chinese 
values, led to nearly two decades of sluggish growth and to various economic 
and social calamities.
Perkins attributes the high rate of growth in Chinese per capita income 
during the past three decades to reforms that began in 1978. As a result of 
these reforms, the government was able to generate a high internal rate of 
investment, promote foreign trade, open China to foreign investment (with 
its accompanying advanced technology and know- how), and transform 
China into a market economy. However, these processes of transformation 
are not complete, and the future rate of growth will depend on success in 
completing the necessary reforms. The main future challenge, he argues, will 
be “to maintain a stable environment” for economic growth while the Chi-
nese “political system evolves to one more suitable for an educated, increas-
ingly high income country” (Perkins 2006b, 263).
Perkins’s historical perspective helps to inform recent eﬀorts to resolve the 
confl icting views of growth theorists (Maddison 1998). In a 1999 paper, Nel-
son and Pack stressed that it was not merely the introduction of advanced 
technology into East and South Asia that accounted for their rapid growth. 
More crucial was the restructuring of the economy to eﬀectively absorb the 
new technologies. Such absorption required a policy regime that encouraged 
the development not only of an educational system that helped entrepre-
neurs and technicians to begin the process of mastering and deploying the 
new technologies, but also of  an industrial structure that permitted this 
new cadre to gain the experience needed to eﬀectively exploit the new tech-
nologies. “To learn to use new technologies,” they wrote, “and to function 
eﬀectively in new sectors required the development of  new sets of  skills, 
new ways of organizing activities, and becoming familiar and competent 
in new markets” (Nelson and Pack, 418). They also stressed that “only a 
small portion of what one needs to know . . . is codifi ed in machine manu-
als, textbooks, and blueprints; much of it is tacit and learning is as much 
by doing and using as by reading and studying” (418; see also Nelson and 
Winter 1982; Rosenberg 1994). The usual growth accounting procedures, 
they argued, “would attribute the major share of  growth simply to the 
growth of capital,” when assimilation and industrial restructuring were the 
main forces driving growth (426).
Beyond these technical issues about how to interpret the available infor-
mation, there is a lively debate about how long China can continue growth 
at rates greater than ever before achieved for long periods of time. China 
has emerged as a major global factor in an array of product markets. Now 
second only to the United States in oil consumption, and accounting for 40 
percent of all the growth in global oil consumption in recent years, China 
has also become the world’s largest consumer of steel, cement, and copper 
(OECD 2005; Kato 2004; Morrison 2006).
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11. Despite the slowdown in the production of  China’s automobile industry in 2008, it 
has been estimated by the China Association of Automobile Manufacturers (CAAM) that 
annual production will increase by 5 percent in 2009 (Li 2009). In February 2009, new car 
sales increased by 25 percent in China, partially due to reduced sales taxes on small passenger 
cars (Ying 2009).
12. See Zakaria (2006) and Morrison (2006).
Most of China’s growth in terms of per capita income (69 percent between 
1978 and 2002) is due to increases in labor productivity. Within industry, the 
increase in labor productivity was 6.2 percent per annum and 5.7 percent per 
annum in agriculture. About 30 percent of China’s growth rate is likely to 
continue to come from modest increases in the labor force participation rate 
and interindustry shifts. Much of China’s labor force is still in agriculture, 
so there is substantial potential for growth through a shift to industry and 
services as it moves toward the current technological frontier.
Investment in capital—especially human capital—is capable of  rapid 
development in the next several decades. The increases in enrollment ratios 
outlined in table 10.6, combined with the knowledge that a college- educated 
worker is 3.1 times as productive (and a high- school graduate is 1.8 times 
as productive), as a worker with less than a ninth- grade education, underlie 
the potential for growth (Fogel 2006).
As a result of  its rapid growth in per capita income, China has also 
emerged as a major player in the production and sale of  manufacturing 
products. As indicated by table 10.9, Chinese production of autos in 2007 
exceeded all of the major national producers except the United States and 
Japan. Moreover, given the current rates of increase in the auto production 
of all the nations, it is likely that China will be the global leader in auto 
production by 2010 or 2011.11
Ownership of  other major consumer durable products has also been 
increasing at spectacular rates. Between 1990 and 2007, Chinese households 
have increased ownership of air conditioners annually by 15 percent, com-
puters by 32 percent, and cell phones by 48 percent (National Bureau of 
Statistics of China 2008).
The rapidly expanding economies of China and India have led many ana-
lysts to speculate on the reemergence of these two economic giants as global 
political players. The most recent assessment of the U.S. National Intelli-
gence Council (2008) conjectures that, by 2025, U.S. political dominance will 
be replaced by what it calls “multipolarity.” This multipolarity it predicts is 
“unlikely to produce a single dominant nation- state with the overwhelming 
power and legitimacy to act as an agent of institutional overhaul” (81).
However, we are already in a multipolar world, which the United States 
helped to create. Our ability to infl uence international aﬀairs is already con-
strained by the desires of Europe, Russia, India, and China. Diplomacy under 
the Clinton and Bush administrations was shaped by such recognition.12
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My own view of future U.S. global infl uence is more conditional. A lot 
depends on the future rate of growth in U.S. labor productivity. If  that con-
tinues at the annual rate of 2 to 4 percent, then it is possible that the United 
States will remain well ahead of its competitors in economic and political 
infl uence down to 2025 and beyond. Much will depend on the willingness 
of the United States to invest heavily in scientifi c research and development, 
and to increase the share of the population educated in the sciences. I am 
optimistic on both of these counts. Unlike China, whose past growth has 
depended on its ability to adapt to the existing technology of the United 
States and other OECD nations to its conditions, the United States is at the 
current production frontier. Hence, its continued growth depends on the rate 
at which it can develop new technologies, which requires a plentiful supply 
of engineers to design new systems of production and distribution, and new 
science on which these new systems will depend. Industry will respond to the 
new technologies, as they have in the past, because they will increase labor 
productivity and raise profi ts.
10.8   Nota Bene
Three key issues have been raised by readers of the original version of this 
chapter (as previously noted).
Table 10.9 Automobile production in Southeast and South Asia compared with 
fi ve Western nations and Japan
   
Production in 2007 
(thousands)  
Production Increase 
over 2006 (%)  
China 8,883 22
Hong Kong
Indonesia 412 39
Korea (South) 4,086 6
Malaysia 442 –12
Singapore
Taiwan 283 –7
Thailand 1,287 8
India 1,708 14
Japan 11,596 1
France 3,016 –5
Germany 6,214 7
Italy 1,284 6
United Kingdom 1,750 6
United States 10,781 –5
 World  73,153  5.7  
Source: Organisation International des Constructeurs d’Automobiles, survey for 2006–2007 
(http://ww.oica.net).
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 1. Why do I predict that the growth rate of GDP for the EU15 will be 
only 1.2 percent per annum between 2000 and 2040?
 2. Why do I believe that U.S. GDP between the same years will grow at 
3.7 percent per annum?
 3. Why am I so optimistic about China’s future growth rate, which I put 
at 8.0 percent per annum between 2000 and 2040?
Let me deal fi rst with my optimistic estimate for China. How and why 
China will become an economic colossus has to do not only with the coun-
try’s economics, but also with its politics. To begin with, it helps to divide 
China’s economy into three major components: agriculture, services, and 
industry. Over the twenty- fi ve years between 1978 and 2003, the growth of 
labor productivity has been high in each of these sectors, averaging about 
6 percent each year. At the national level, however, output per worker grew 
by 9 percent annually over the same period. The national growth exceeded 
the sectoral growth rates because output per worker was much higher in 
industry and services than it was in agriculture. So as millions shifted from 
agriculture—where the bulk of China’s labor has been concentrated—to 
industry or services, the country’s annual growth rate rose by an additional 
3 percentage points. Between 1978 and 2005, about 195 million workers 
shifted from agriculture to industry and services. In other words, internal 
migration accounted for about 47 percent of the labor force in industry and 
services in 2005. I expect such shifts between sectors to continue to be an 
important element in China’s overall economic growth over the next genera-
tion (Fogel 2007).
Many observers believe that social unrest, both active and latent, will 
retard China’s rate of economic growth. Potential pitfalls include the shaky 
state of the banking system. They also include income disparities between 
the rapidly growing coastal provinces and the more slowly growing interior 
provinces, between urban and rural labor, and between highly skilled and 
manual labor. Other potential fl ashpoints arise from pressures on fuel sup-
plies and electrical power, the growth of environmental pollution, and the 
adequacy of water supplies. These problems are well understood by China’s 
leaders and solutions are being actively pursued. So far, the government has 
managed to head oﬀ potential crises.
As a consequence, the polls conducted by reliable agencies reveal a wide-
spread belief  among the Chinese that their living conditions have improved 
and will continue to improve in the future. This optimism refl ects the rapid 
increases in income experienced by the great majority of  households for 
more than a quarter of a century.
Still another possibility is that internal growth will be derailed by inter-
national confl icts such as the border disputes over Kashmir with India 
and Pakistan and disputes over the sovereignty of the Spratly Islands with 
Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam. But these issues are being treated 
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diplomatically rather than militarily. The most tumultuous dispute, over the 
sovereignty of Taiwan, now appears to be headed toward a resolution, tenta-
tively endorsed by both China and the incoming KMT (Chinese Nationalist 
Party) government in Taiwan.
An important factor in sustaining China’s high growth rate will be its 
investments in expanding secondary and tertiary education—another key 
shift likely to boost labor productivity growth. In a 2006 study, I reported 
that high school graduates in the United States were 1.8 times as productive, 
and college- educated workers 3.1 times as productive, as their peers with 
less than a ninth- grade education. Extrapolating these fi ndings to China, 
and estimating that the enrollment ratio in high school will grow to about 
100 percent and in college to about 50 percent over the next generation, 
would, in and of itself, add over 6 percentage points to the annual growth 
rate (Fogel 2006).
These targets for higher education are not out of reach. As recently as 
1980, Western European nations had tertiary enrollment ratios (the ratio of 
the number of students in colleges and universities to the total number of 
persons at college ages, usually eighteen to twenty- two years old) of about 25 
percent; only in the United States was that fi gure above 50. The movement to 
from 25 to 50 in Western Europe took place over just two decades at the end 
of the twentieth century. In the case of Britain, two- thirds of the increase 
from 19 to 52 percent took place between 1990 and 1997.
The signifi cance of investment in human capital as an engine of economic 
growth has not eluded the State Council in China. In 1998, Jiang Zemin 
called for a massive increase in enrollments in higher education, and the 
response was swift. Over the next four years, enrollment in higher education 
increased by 165 percent (from 3.4 million to 9.0 million), and the number 
of  students studying abroad rose by 152 percent. Given that the tertiary 
enrollment ratio increased by about 50 percent between 2000 and 2004 (from 
12.5 to 19.0 percent), my projection for 2040 is not overly optimistic. China 
is already on track to reach it (Fogel 2007).
Next, my forecast for the EU15. Here, demography is the key issue. What 
is worrisome is not just the zero rate of population growth (the demographic 
forecasts are not mine but those of the United Nations population division) 
but the changes in the age structure of the population.
The population of OECD nations has been aging rapidly, and that trend 
is likely to continue over the next several decades. Columns (1) and (2) of 
table 10.10 present the forecast of the Population Division of the United 
Nations on the change in the median age of the fi ve largest West European 
nations. In Germany, Italy, and Spain, the predicted increases range between 
eleven and fourteen years. In France and the United Kingdom, the median 
age increases by six and fi ve years, respectively.
Columns (3) and (4) forecast the change in percentage of the population 
that will be over sixty- fi ve. For Germany and Italy, the elderly will increase 
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to nearly one- third of the population. Only in the United Kingdom will the 
elderly be less than one- quarter of the population.
The basic reason for the rapid aging of the population has been the low 
level of  fertility. In all of  these countries, the total fertility rate has been 
below the level needed to replace their populations for several decades. As 
a result, the percentage of  women in the childbearing ages has declined 
from about 50 percent in 2000 (it was also about 50 percent in 1950) and 
is projected to be about 35 percent in 2040. So we have a double whammy 
(to use American slang): not only will women in the reproductive ages have 
sharply reduced fertility rates, but the proportion of women who are in the 
childbearing ages will also have declined sharply (see table 10.11).
Attitudes toward sex have evolved sharply. One- hundred and fi fty years 
ago, it was considered a sin to enjoy sex, the only legitimate purpose for 
which was procreation. But today, even in Rome, young women respond that 
sex is mainly a recreational activity. Behind the statistics on trends in fertility 
is a vast change in ethics embodied in a culture that is much diﬀerent from 
that embraced by the generation that fought in World War II, which married 
early and produced the great baby boom between 1945 and 1965.
The widespread embrace of  the ethic that celebrates sex as recreation 
Table 10.10 Median age and percent of population age 65 and over in fi ve European 
nations in 2000 and 2040
 Country  
Median age
 
Percentage age 65 
and over
 
2000
(1)  
2040
(2)
2000
(3)  
2040
(4)
France 37.7 44.2 16.1 26.5
Germany 40.0 51.2 16.4 31.8
Italy 40.3 50.9 18.4 31.8
Spain 37.6 49.1 16.8 28.1
 United Kingdom 37.7  42.3  15.9  22.6  
Source: http://esa.un.org/unpp.
Table 10.11 Percentage of women aged 15–49 in 2000 and 2040
 Country  2000  2040  
Percentage 
decline  
France 47.5 38.3 19
Germany 46.8 34.6 26
Italy 47.0 34.4 27
Spain 50.8 35.8 30
 United Kingdom 46.8  41.5  11  
Source: http://esa.un.org/unpp.
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means that the rate of  natural increase (births minus deaths) is likely to 
decline in the principal EU15 nations. Indeed, even in 2000, the natural 
rate of increase was negative in Germany and Italy. By 2040, it is likely that 
natural increase will be negative in all of the designated nations except the 
United Kingdom (see table 10.12).
Although the twentieth century increase in the share of the population 
that is elderly is a tribute to the great advances in economic performance, 
biomedical sciences, and environmental improvements, there is no auto-
matic guarantee of equitable balance between the generations in the future. 
Indeed, there are new problems that will have to be solved if  a third of popu-
lation in 2040 is over age sixty- fi ve.
Moreover, since younger workers are a major source of new ideas, slow-
ing down the ascendency of  the next generation may retard the pace of 
technological change. The solution to such problems will not be easy. The 
elderly should not be shunted aside as if  they were rotten tomatoes. To force 
their premature retirement will undermine not only their morale, but also 
the morale of those who expect to replace them.
As a result of the demographic trends, the dependency ratio is expected to 
rise sharply in four of the fi ve largest EU15 nations between the years 2000 
and 2040, as shown by table 10.13.
The inverse of one plus the dependency rates is a reasonable proxy for the 
labor force participation rate (which I designate by ). Hence, table 10.13 
suggests an annual rate of decline of 0.4 percent in the labor force participa-
Table 10.12 Predicted changes in the natural rate of increase (per thousand)
 Country  2000  2040  
France 3.8 –0.3
Germany –1.5 –6.2
Italy –0.7 –4.3
Spain 1.4 –0.9
 United Kingdom 1.3  0.7  
Source: http://esa.un.org/unpp.
Table 10.13 Predicted changes in the dependency ratio
 Country  2000  2040  
Percentage 
increase  
France .54 .75 39
Germany .47 .79 68
Italy .49 .81 65
Spain .46 .72 57
 United Kingdom .54  .64  19  
Source: http://esa.un.org/unpp (2008 revision).
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tion rate due purely to changes in the age structure of the population. I allow 
 to decline by an additional 0.2 percent per annum because of a reduction 
in the length of the work year over the period 2000 to 2040. This allowance 
raises the annual rate of decline in  to 0.6 percent per annum. Since I expect 
the annual rate of growth in labor productivity of the fi ve nations to average 
about 1.8 percent, it follows that their annual rate of growth in both per 
capita income and GDP will average 1.2 percent.
Now let me turn to my forecast for the United States. Although the United 
States and EU15 growth rates were the same during 1975 to 2005, I do not 
believe that to be an overriding consideration. The key issue is the slow-
ness of the European Union relative to the United States in adopting the 
new information technology. Other issues are the greater EU preference for 
leisure than commodities when compared with the United States, and the 
decline of the EU’s annual rate of growth in labor productivity from 2.4 per-
cent during 1980 to 1995 to 1.5 percent during 1995 to 2004. By comparison, 
U.S. labor productivity growth increased from 1.5 percent per annum during 
1980 to 1995 to 3.0 percent during 1995 to 2004 (van Ark, O’Mahony, and 
Timmer 2008).
During 1995 to 2004, U.S. GDP grew at 3.7 percent per annum. I believe 
that this high rate will persist down to 2040 because of continuing techno-
logical advances in genetic engineering, health care, information technology, 
transportation, energy production and consumption, and education (van 
Ark, O’Mahony, and Timmer 2008).
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